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DAMNED FOR USING DAYCARE:
APPELLATE BRIEF OF JENNIFER IRELAND
IN IRELAND V SMITHt
Julie Kunce Tield*
"Where we love is home,
Home that our feet may leave, but not our hearts."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes
INTRODUCTION
At issue is custody of three-and-a-half-year-old Maranda (date of
birth: April 22, 1991). The trial court found that Maranda had an
established custodial environment with her mother, Jennifer Ireland, but
then nominally ordered custody changed to Steven Smith. The court's
order changing custody was based on a determination that day care is
an inappropriate choice for care of a preschool child, and that no one
effectively can be a single parent and a student at the same time. Those
findings have no factual basis in the record, no legal basis under Michi-
gan law, and no logical or even common sense basis at all. In addition,
the trial court in effect gave custody of Maranda not to Smith, but to
his parents, who were not even parties to the custody action.
The trial court's decision is completely contrary to law, has no
basis in fact, and appears to be infected with bias against single mothers
and non-traditional families. The trial court's decision must be reversed,
and Maranda must be allowed to stay in her home with her mother.
t Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), affd as modified, 547
N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 1996).
Julie Kunce Field (J.D. 1985, University of Chicago Law School) is an Associate
Professor of Law at the Washburn University Law School.
Much of the credit for the research and drafting of this brief goes to three
outstanding attorneys: Alicia Aiken, M. Caroline Padgett, and Charlotte Croson (all
University of Michigan Law School J.D. 1995). Their work on this brief represents
just one small part of their excellent work on behalf of the many dients of the now
dosed Women and the Law Clinic.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
When she was sixteen, Jennifer Ireland gave birth to Maranda.'
Steven Smith, Maranda's father, was also sixteen.2 The parties never
married or even lived together.3 When he found out he was going to be
a father, Smith urged Ms. Ireland to have an abortion. She refused.4 He
had nothing further to do with Ms. Ireland or her daughter until
Maranda was nearly one year old.5 After Maranda's birth, Ms. Ireland
placed Maranda in foster care, anticipating an adoption. Smith signed
papers allowing for the adoption.6 Approximately three weeks later, Ms.
Ireland decided that she could, and would, raise her child herself 7 It
was not until over one year later that Smith reconsidered his decision to
terminate his parental rights to Maranda.8
Ms. Ireland and Maranda lived in Harrison Township, Macomb
County. Ms. Ireland fulfilled all of her obligations as a mother while
continuing to excel in high school.9 During this time, Ms. Ireland's
mother and sister helped Ms. Ireland care for Maranda."' During the
first year of Maranda's life, Smith had no contact with her. He did not
seek visitation with, nor did he provide any financial support for, his
daughter." He continued on in high school and his many sports activi-
ties, unencumbered by any recognition or fulfillment of his duties as a
1. T I, 17-18. The transcripts were not given volume numbers. For convenience, the
transcript citations will be assigned volume numbers in chronological order: May
13, 1994 is Volume I; May 31 is Volume II; June 1 is Volume III; June 2 is Vol-
ume IliA; June 3 is Volume IIIB; and June 6 is Volume IV. (Volumes IliA and
IIIB were prepared by reporters other than the court's usual reporter). The post trial
hearings are cited: July 25 is Volume V, and July 27 is Volume VI. So the cite "T
I, 17-18" refers to Volume I (May 13, 1994), pages 17-18. The trial court's
opinion, Smith v. Ireland, No. 93-385-DS (Mich. Dist. Ct. June 27, 1994), will be
cited as "Op" with the specific page reference.
2. T IlA, 196.
3. T IIIB, 53.
4. T liA, 197.
5. T liA, 200, 294.
6. T liA, 202.
7. T IIIB, 182-183.
8. T IlA, 201-203.
9. T IIIB, 188-190.
10. T IIIB, 184-186; IIIB, 117-119.
11. T III, 323; IlA, 199-200, 94-95; IIIB, 37, 59, 32-33, 202-203; IV, 357-359.
[Vol. 3:569
APPELLATE BRIEF OF JENNIFER IRELAND
father. 2 He lived, and continues to live, with his parents.13 He has no
plans to move out of his parents' house and live independently.14
From the time Maranda was a year old, with Ms. Ireland's encour-
agement, Smith had informal visits with Maranda. Many of the visits
were also with Ms. Ireland, since the parties had started dating again.
15
Smith and his witnesses described how others were always present
during Smith's visits: his mother, Ms. Ireland, Jenny Schulte, or Melissa
Roy. 6 Smith's mother was instrumental in caring for Maranda during
visits. 17 No one testified to any visit where Smith alone cared for
Maranda during the entire visit. Maranda has never lived with Smith."8
Indeed, as the court below emphasized: "It cannot be ignored that the
plaintiff has borne the burden of raising the child up through this
period.... and the child and the mother are united and that the
mother looks to the future to have this relationship continued on a
permanent basis."19
In late December 1992 and again on January 1, 1993, Smith
assaulted Ms. Ireland, pushing, shoving, and bruising her. Maranda was
present during at least one of those assaults.2" Ms. Ireland told friends
of the assaults when they occurred,21 and reported the assaults to the
police on January 1, 1993. Because of these assaults, Ms. Ireland
stopped informal visitation with Smith; she feared for Maranda's and
her safety.
2 2
On January 27, 1993, Ms. Ireland filed a complaint for child
support. Smith was ordered to pay $62 per week in support.2 3 He
objected, and the order was reduced to $8 per week.24 When support
was increased to $12 per week by order dated July 12, 1993, Smith
12. T III, 17, 197-198; IIIA, 208.
13. T IIIA, 188; IIIB, 41.
14. T IIIB, 90-91, 95-96.
15. T I, 94-95; IIIA, 97, 213-214.
16. T III, 23, 116, 95, 294; II, 195-196; IIIA, 68-69.
17. Op, 3.
18. T IIIB, 96.
19. Op, 3.
20. T I, 85-87; IIIA, 218-225.
21. T I, 86; II, 200.
22. T I, 88, 95-98.
23. January 29, 1993 Order.
24. March 15, 1993 Order.
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objected and asked that it be reduced.2 5 Even at that low level of sup-
port, Smith was consistently behind and brought into court on enforce-
ment proceedings.26 According to Friend of the Court records, as of
July 27, 1994, the date the custody judgment was signed, Smith was
$342.50 behind in child support and owed $183.16 in medical expens-
es for Maranda.27 In February, 1993, after being ordered to pay sup-
port, Smith petitioned for custody of Maranda.2" He had never before
sought custody of, or formal visitation with, Maranda.
In the fall of 1993, Maranda and her mother moved to Ann Arbor
where Ms. Ireland began attending the University of Michigan, having
earned several scholarships.29 Ms. Ireland and Maranda lived in an
apartment through University family housing.50 Maranda attended a
University-approved, licensed, home-based child care program while
Ms. Ireland attended classes.31 Smith has never contributed to the cost
of child care. In September 1994, Ms. Ireland and her daughter re-
turned to Ann Arbor and are again living in University family housing.
Maranda attends the same University-approved child care she attended
in 1993, a place where, the trial court found, Maranda had a meaning-
ful experience.
32
In the summer and fall of 1993, both parties were evaluated by the
Macomb County Friend of the Court and Dr. Terrance Campbell of
the Psychodiagnostic and Family Services Clinic.3 3 Ms. Ireland was
evaluated in the context of the independent family unit she had estab-
lished with her daughter.34 Smith was evaluated in conjunction with his
parents.3 5 The Friend of the Court recommended that custody remain
25. December 8, 1993 Motion for Relief from Order and to Reduce Child Support and
to Cancel Arrearages.
26. November 15, 1993 Order of Income Withholding (issued upon a finding of an
arrearage in excess of four weeks).
27. Friend of the Court, Statement of Arrearage.
28. February 9, 1993 Motion for Change of Custody.
29. T IIIB, 122, 146, 188-189.
30. T I, 12-13; IIIB, 146.
31. T IIIB, 74, 345-347. Because of the trial schedule in this case, Ms. Ireland had to
take a leave from the University during the winter term, 1994. During that time,
she worked in a day care center in Macomb County and had Maranda with her at
work. T 1, 12, 101-102.
32. Op, 7.
33. T IIIB, 52; IV, 395.
34. T IIIB, 52-53.
35. T IIIB, 52-53.
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with Ms. Ireland. 6 Dr. Campbell concluded that "Ms. Ireland is re-
sponding more than adequately to her daughter as the physical custodi-
an. Removing Maranda from the familiarity of her current custodial
environment would only create difficult adjustment problems for her."
37
Dr. Campbell also determined that Ms. Ireland has "defined her status
as a single parent as a priority equal to her status as a college student."
38
Smith rejected the professional recommendations, and this case
went to trial in May and June 1994. Although the court is required to
follow the Child Custody Act of 1970, there was a great deal of imper-
missible and irrelevant testimony presented by Smith which went
outside the boundaries of the best interests guidelines. Counsel for
Smith presented statements-primarily through hearsay or counsel's
own arguments-which alleged that Ms. Ireland engaged in sexual
activity, and supposedly had had more than one abortion. 9 Although
none of the sexual conduct as presented by Smith was even claimed to
have occurred within a year of trial, and although objected to as inad-
missible, irrelevant, and prejudicial, the court allowed the statements to
be made"0 and made comments during trial concerning the testimony
by Smith's counsel and the hearsay accusations. These comments
wrongly assumed that the allegations were relevant and admissible.
4 1
Never was there testimony claiming that Ms. Ireland engaged in sexual
activity in front of her daughter, that Maranda even knew of any
alleged sexual activity, or that any sexual activity in which Ms. Ireland
was alleged to have engaged harmed Maranda in any way.
Smith also presented a great deal of untrue and unsubstantiated
hearsay and statements by his counsel alleging that Ms. Ireland and her
family were neglectful and abusive of Maranda. By Smith's own admis-
sion, the Child Protective Services found that allegations of abuse made
by Smith and his family were an attempt to "build a case against Jenny'
due to "the upcoming custody battle."42 Judicial notice was taken of the
fact that Child Protective Services found no abuse of Maranda, and the
36. T IIIB, 397; Zeihm report, 3.
37. T IIIB, 54; Campbell report, 2.
38. Campbell report, 2.
39. T I, 17, 19-23, 33, 39-40, 45, 53, 61, 63, 65-79, 114; II, 166-170, 238,
243-256, 265-266, 275; III, 302-303, 309; IIIA, 9, 13, 18-28, 31-33, 36-38,
48-49, 146-147, 209, 214-217.
40. T I, 20.
41. T I, 67, 78; II, 167, 172-173; III, 340.
42. T IIIB, 31.
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court remarked: "When they don't act.., my conclusion would be they
found nothing to justify them using intervention."O3 Additionally, Smith
and his parents admitted that they routinely follow and spy upon Ms.
Ireland and her family.1
4
On June 27, 1994, the court issued its opinion finding an estab-
lished custodial environment with Ms. Ireland.45 The court then found
the parties equal in all 12 factors under the Child Custody Act of 1970
except factor (e) "[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home."" The court found that factor (e) "takes on
supreme importance in view of the Court's assessment of the remaining
issues as being virtually equal." 47 Under factor (e), the court concluded
that Smith's mother would raise the child in her home "for an indefinite
period of time. "48
In his discussion of factor (e), the trial judge gave great weight to
the fact that "[u]nder the future plans of the mother, the minor child
will be in essence raised and supervised a great part of the time by
strangers. Under the future plans of the father, the minor child will be
raised and supervised by blood relatives." 9 The Court also found it
"pivotal" that Ms. Ireland intended to continue on with her scholarships
at the University of Michigan:
The mother's academic pursuits, although laudable, are de-
manding and in order to complete her program it necessitates
the leaving of the child for a considerable portion of its [sic]
life in the care of strangers. There is no way that a single
parent, attending an academic program at an institution as
prestigious as the University of Michigan, can do justice to
their studies and the raising of an infant child. There are not
that many hours in the day.
50
Yet the only evidence pertaining to Ms. Ireland's ability to attend school
and adequately care for her daughter was uncontroverted and shows that
43. T IIIB, 30.
44. T I, 96; III, 302-305, 307-309, 330-331; IIIA, 158-160; IIIB, 101.
45. Op, 3.
46. MIcH. CoMp. LAws. ANN. § 722.23 (1993 & West Supp. 1994).
47. Op, 10-11.
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she is quite capable of being a successful single parent and a full-time
University student simultaneously.
51
Smith's ability to care for or provide a stable home for Maranda
independently of his parents was not evaluated by the trial court. There
was no evidence submitted regarding Smith's plans to raise Maranda
alone or outside of his parents' house. Additionally, there is nothing in
the record to support a conclusion that Smith's mother is a suitable
custodian of Maranda for an extended period. There was nothing
presented regarding the benefits or detriments of relative care vs. profes-
sional child care to this, or any, child. There was no testimony or
evidence as to the type of care Smith's mother would provide Maranda.
Testimony was limited to the fact that Smith's mother, a traditional
housewife, would be at home all day while the men of the Smith house
went to work and to school.
Despite Smith's testimony regarding his admitted assaults of Ms.
Ireland, and his family's testimony acknowledging their stalking behav-
ior,52 the Court found the parties equal on factor (k), the existence of
domestic violence. However, and inconsistently with the evidence
presented, it was the court's opinion that the evidence of domestic
violence was irrelevant and superfluous.
53
On July 27, 1994, the court entered its judgment ordering the
transfer of Maranda to Smith and his parents. Ms. Ireland requested
transition counseling for all parties and the minor child, so that three-
year-old Maranda could be emotionally prepared for the transfer out of
her lifetime home with her mother. That request was refused.54 On
August 9, 1994, this Court stayed transfer of custody of Maranda.
51. T IIIB, 80-81, 54.
52. The trial judge noted that he understood the Smith family to be engaged in stalking.
T III, 336. See generally MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.41 1h-.41 Ii (West Supp.
1995).
53. Op, 9-10.
54. T IV, 13-18.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT
OF EVIDENCE, IS A PALPABLE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR
SHOWS CLEAR LEGAL ERROR, AND IT IS IN THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF MARANDA TO STAY WITH HER MOTHER.
A. This Court Must Reverse Without Remand.
Reversal without remand is appropriate where the appellate court
Ccan conclude that the child custody factors taken as a whole were
erroneously weighed in favor of the wrong party."" Review of the
dispositional ruling of the trial court in a custody case is de novo where
the trial court has made findings of fact against the great weight of the
evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal
error on a major issue.56 The review is also de novo for a trial court's
conclusions of law, "'where a finding is derived from an erroneous
application of law to facts,'" or "'where the factual findings may have
been influenced by an incorrect view of the law.' 57 A finding of fact is
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard: "[a] finding is clearly
erroneous if the appellate court, on all the evidence, is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.""
Where there is an established custodial environment, the moving
party must show by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child to change custody.59 An established custodial envi-
ronment is created "if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks
to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the
necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the
physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child
as to the permanency of the relationship shall also be considered."60
55. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. 505, 521, 504 N.W.2d 684, 691 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
56. Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. at 521, 504 N.W.2d at 691.
57. Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. at 510, 504 N.W.2d at 687 (citing Beason v. Beason, 435
Mich. 791, 804-05, 460 N.W.2d 207, 213 (1990)).
58. Harper v. Harper, 199 Mich. App. 409, 410, 502 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993), (per curiam) (citing Beason, 435 Mich. 805, 460 N.W.2d at 212);
Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. at 510, 504 N.W.2d at 687 (citing Beason, 435 Mich. at
805, 460 N.W.2d at 212 (1990)).
59. MicH. ComP. LAws § 722.27(1)(c) (1993).
60. Mic. Coamp. LAws § 722.27(1)(c) (1993).
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In this case, there is no factual or legal basis which rises to clear
and convincing evidence that Maranda should be removed from the
established custodial environment she has with her mother. The trial
court decision must be reversed.
B. There Is An Established Custodial Environment
Between Maranda And Her Mother.
The trial court correctly found an established custodial environment
between Maranda and Ms. Ireland. A finding of an established custodial
environment is a determination that there is a:
relationship of a significant duration in which [the child] was
provided the parental care, discipline, love, guidance and
attention appropriate to [her] age and individual needs; an
environment in both the physical and psychological sense in
which the relationship between the custodian and the child is
marked by qualities of security, stability and permanence.
61
The best interests standard and Michigan family law place a premium
on permanence and stability in custody decisions. Therefore, it takes
clear and convincing evidence to change a child's custodial environ-
ment.62 This is in accord with child development research.63
Baker requires that where there is an established custodial environ-
ment, custody will not be changed "except in the most compelling
cases .... "64 That language has been interpreted by this Court to require
a more than marginal improvement if custody is changed. 65 The legisla-
ture expressed its strong desire to secure stable, final placements for
children and requires that the compelling reason supporting a change in
custody must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
66
61. Baker Y. Baker, 411 Mich. 567, 579-80, 309 N.W.2d 532, 536 (1981) (emphasis
added).
62. MICH. CoMp. LAws § 722.27 (1993).
63. See, e.g., JOSEPH GoLsEIN ET AL, BEYOND THE BEST IrrEsrsS OF aE CHILD 33
(1973).
64. Baker, 411 Mich. at 577, 309 N.W.2d at 535.
65. Carson v. Carson, 156 Mich. App. 291, 401 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986);
Harper v. Harper, 199 Mich. App. 409, 502 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam).
66. Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.27(1)(c); Carson, 156 Mich. App. 291, 401 N.W.2d 632.
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The record reflects that Maranda lived with her mother from the
time she was three weeks old. Maranda has never lived with Smith. The
court found as a matter of fact that "the plaintiff has been the custodial
parent during the child's entire life,"67 and that "the child having spent
the greatest amount of her life with the plaintiff in the plaintiffs moth-
er's home, looks to plaintiff naturally for guidance, discipline and the
necessities of life. '6' The record also shows in no uncertain terms that
Smith is completely incapable of providing Maranda even the basic
necessities of life; he has petitioned the court to keep his child support
payments to $8 per week, and is behind, even at that low level of
support. The trial court's findings in regard to Smith show that his
relationship with Maranda is quite different than Ms. Ireland's. The trial
court notes that Smith's relationship is based on "visitation from about
the time the child was one year old."69 The court found that "[tihe
child, while on visitation, appears to have made a normal adjustment to
the defendant and his relatives, . . [t]he fact remains, however, that it
is only visitation and in many instances the facets of child rearing are
not faced during those periods."7' The record supports that conclusion:
no one testified to any visit where Smith alone was responsible for
Maranda during the entire visit.
In comparing the differing relationships Maranda has with her two
parents, the court-found: "the child and the mother are united and that
the mother looks to the future to have this relationship continued on a
permanent basis .... The fact that the child adjusts to periodic visita-
tion cannot be construed as undermining the reality of the day-to-day
relationship which the child shares with her mother."71 The court's
finding that there is an established custodial environment with Ms.
Ireland is consistent with existing law.
Therefore, Smith had to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that custody should be changed. He has not done so, and the trial




70. Op, 3 (emphasis added).
71. Op, 3 .
[Vol. 3:569
APPELLATE BRIEF OF JENNIFER IRELAND
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AND ARBITRARILY TOOK
MARANDA OUT OF HER CUSTODIAL HOME BECAUSE OF HER
MOTHER S EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND HER CHOICE TO USE
DAY CARE.
A. There Was No Clear And Convincing Evidence
Supporting The Court's Conclusion That
Ms. Ireland's Choice To Use Day Care Was A
Valid Basis For Changing Custody.
The trial court removed Maranda from her mother's custody
because of Ms. Ireland's choice to use day care. Although the court
below purports to base its decision on findings under factor (e) of the
guidelines, the court unquestionably based its analysis on Ms. Ireland's
choice to use day care and decided that no one is capable of being a
single parent and a student at the same time.72
The lower court's decision to change Maranda's custody because of
Ms. Ireland's choice to use day care while she betters herself through her
studies at Michigan does not amount to clear and convincing evidence
and is clear legal error and abuse of discretion and against the great
weight of the evidence. In essence, the trial court penalized Ms. Ireland
for being something other than a full-time, stay-at-home mother, a
determination that has implications for thousands of working parents in
Michigan.
1. Daycare is not relevant to factor (e).
Michigan law sets out twelve factors which define the best interests
test.73 Factor (e) demands consideration of "the permanence, as a family
unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes." On its face,
this language says nothing about a parent's choice of child care environ-
ments. In interpreting and applying (e), this Court held that the factor
"exclusively concerns whether the family unit will remain intact."74 The
use of day care has no bearing on the intactness of the family unit. By
bringing day care and student status into factor (e), the trial court
considered irrelevant information. That is legal error requiring reversal.
72. Op, 8.
73. MICH. COMP. LAws § 722.23 (1993 & West Supp. 1994).
74. Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. at 517, 504 N.W.2d at 690.
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2. Maranda benefitted from her day care placement.
Unless it is shown to be detrimental to the child, a custodial
parent's choice of child care environments is not relevant to a modifica-
tion of custody. Without a showing of harm to the child, the mere
choice to use one type of child care over another cannot alone rise to
clear and convincing evidence needed to change custody. The trial
court's decision to the contrary is without legal basis or any factual
support and must be reversed.
Michigan law believes that using paid day care is an acceptable
parenting choice. For example, the Child Support Guidelines specifically
provide for allowances for child care costs as an element of support.
75
Other states have specifically addressed day care use. In 1986, the
California Supreme Court addressed precisely this issue in Burchard v.
Garay.76 The court specifically rejected a decision that "care by a mother
who, because of work and study, must entrust the child to daycare
centers and babysitters, is per se inferior to care by a father who also
works, but can leave the child with a stepmother at home."77
The court found that status as a working mother must not be used
against a parent in a custody dispute:
[I]n an era where over 50 percent of mothers and almost 80
percent of divorced mothers work, the courts must not presume
that a working mother is a less satisfactory parent or less fully
committed to the care of her child. A custody determination
must be based upon a true assessment of the emotional bonds
between a parent and child .... It must reflect also a factual
determination of how best to provide continuity of attention,
nurturing and care. It cannot be based on an assumption,
unsupported by scientific evidence, that a working mother
cannot provide such care .... [A]ny presupposition that single
working parents provide inferior care to their children will in
75. See FRIEND OF THE CoURT ADvisoRy COMMITTEE, MICHIGAN CHILD SuPPoRT
GUIDELINE MANUAL 22 (1994): "Work-related child care expenses include those
expenses which allow the parent to look for employment, retain paid employment,
or be enrolled in an educational program which will improve employment opportuni-
ties."
76. Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486 (1986).
77. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492.
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practice discriminate against women. Divorced men are more
likely to remarry than divorced women, and far more likely to
marry a nonworking spouse.7"
Maranda is not a rarity because she receives care outside of the home
by someone other than her mother. Maranda is among a significant
majority of her peers: more than two-thirds of pre-school children in the
United States between the ages of three and five receive care outside the
home.79 Preschool is common and proven to be beneficial to children.80
If the trial judge's analysis that the use of day care itself is a clear and
convincing reason to change custody, then over 440,000 children in
Michigan"' and millions of children in the U.S. 2 would be at risk of
having their established home taken from them.
The fact is, Maranda thrived in her licensed day care setting in Ann
Arbor. There was not even a hint that the child care arrangement
approved by the University and chosen by Ms. Ireland was harmful to
Maranda in any way. Even the lower court conceded that the day care
"program at the U of M... apparently was appropriate and resulted in
the child having a meaningful experience." 3 This finding in itself
establishes that the court below committed clear legal error requiring
reversal.
78. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 540, 724 P.2d at 492 n.10.
79. New Report Eplores Preschool Care and Early Education, 22 CHILDREN TODAY No.
2, at 2 (1993) (citing report tided "Profile of Preschool Children's Child Care and
Early Education Program Participation," US Dept. of Education).
80. See Brief ofAmici Curiae Child Care Law Center, et at, at 14-34.
81. See findings in Kid Count:. Child Care and Early Childhood Education in Michigan,
KDs CoUNT IN MICHIGAN, Sept. 1993, at 9. In 1990 more than 440,000 children
under 6 required child care because their parents were in the labor force.
82. See findings of SANDRA HOFFERTH et at, URBAN INs=rrtrrE REPORT 95-5, NATIONAL
CHILD CARE SURVEY, 1990 27-33 (1991) (For example, in 1990 approximately 3.8
million children under 5 were primarily cared for in child-care centers; another 2.0
million received care in family child-care homes.). Child Care and Development:. Key
Facts, a publication of the Children's Defense Fund, Washington, D.C. 1994.
83. Op, 7.
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3. The trial court erred by relying on broad, and incor-
rect, assumptions about paid child care and child
development.
a. Blood relatives are not necessarily better
caregivers just because they are related, and day-
care providers are not "strangers."
There were no facts upon which the trial court could determine that
a preschooler is better off with a blood relative than with a "stranger."
Indeed, there could be none. Recent research shows that there are no
benefits to relative care over nonrelative care in terms of quality.84 The
study found that "being regulated is more important to quality child
care-while being related is much less important-than many parents
believe."85 Further, "[r]egulated providers are rated as more sensitive and
observed to be offering more responsive care than non-regulated or relative
caregivers .... 86
A corollary to the assumption that blood relatives provide better care
than non-relatives is the characterization of paid care providers as
"strangers."87 The court below noted with disapproval that Ms. Ireland's
plan for her daughter "necessitates the leaving of the child for a consid-
erable portion of its life in the care of strangers." 8 Care providers are not
strangers to the children for whom they care.89 The trial court's elevation
of "blood relative" care over "stranger" care is unquestionably reversible
error.
b. Day care is good for children.
Nor was there any factual basis for the trial court's implicit as-
sumption that day care is bad for children.9° This characterization by the
84. ELLEN GALiNsKY ET AL, THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILy CHiLD CARE AND
REL arv CARE 1994 (Study by the Families and Work Institute),
85. See supra note 84, at 3.
86. See supra note 84, at 47.
87. Interestingly, the trial court's limitation of appropriate caregivers to blood relatives
would eliminate stepparents as care providers.
88. Op, 8.
89. See supra note 84, at 5 ("children are not more likely to be securely attached to
providers who are relatives than to nonrelatives"). For more on this issue, see Brief
ofAmici Curiae Child Care Law Center, et aL, at 14-17.
90. Susan Faludi, The AUds Are All Right: Research Shows Our Bias Against Day Care is
Unfounded, UTNE RE ER, May/June 1993, at 68. (Responding to the "supposed and
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lower court is based on widespread societal myths, not on any facts in the
record or any valid legal standard. A trial court's conclusion that is based
on a myth by its nature is reversible error. A plausible view of the
evidence can be upheld,91 one based on myth is not based on a view of
any evidence, plausible or otherwise. Again, research disproves whatever
notions the trial court may have regarding day care's harm to children.
In fact, regulated day care has significant developmental benefits for
children Maranda's age. Addressing a number of studies conducted over
the last eight years, one author observed "[t]hese studies all suggest that
children in daycare centers and preschool programs tend to be more
socially skilled and intellectually advanced than children at home with
their parents, sitters, or in [unregulated] day care homes." 92 The same
researcher found that full time, professional day care ranked significantly
higher in terms of benefits to children than did care provided at home
with relatives.93 A program comparable to the one Maranda attends was
rated 5.5 on a 6.0 point scale evaluating children's verbal ability, cogni-
tion, creativity, social competence, cooperation, and social cognition, while
care provided in the home by a relative was rated only 1.5.94
Finally, the benefits to children are not the only benefits of day care.
For many families, child care is essential to family self-sufficiency. This
is especially true for female-headed families. A parent's ability to pursue
and complete her own education or job training-enabled by placing her
children in day care-has direct and immediate consequences for the
future welfare of her family.
95
much publicized day care child abuse 'epidemic,'" Susan Faludi cites a 1988 study
conducted by the University of New Hampshire's Family Research Laboratory: "if
there is an 'epidemic' of child abuse, it's in the home-where children are almost twice
as likely to be molested as in day care.")
91. See Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. 505, 504 N.W.2d 684.
92. K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, A Home is Not a Schook The Effects of Child Care on
Children's Development, 47 JouRNAL OF SocILr Issuas No. 2 at 105, 109 (1991).
93. Center care was defined as day care provided by regulated, educated providers-the
category into which Maranda's program falls.
94. The findings of social scientists are echoed by parents. One article reports that 97%
of women are "convinced that their child benefits from (daycare) because it is
educational, contributes to personal development, and builds personal skills." Vivian
Cadden, How Idds Benefitfrom Child Care, WORKING MOTHER April 1993, at 58.
The same study found that mothers' "enthusiasm about the educational value of
daycare does not carry over to their assessment of one-on-one care provided by nannies
or relatives." Supra, at 61. See also Clarke-Stewart, supra note 92, at 108.
95. See findings in NIcoLE PoEascH, GINA ADAMS, AND JODI SANDFORT, CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND, CHILD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT: KEY FACTs 4-5 (1994). See also
Brief ofAmicus Curiae Child Care Law Center, et at 14-34.1.
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There is no evidence whatsoever that Maranda was ill cared for in
her program in Ann Arbor. There is no evidence she would be better
cared for by Grandma Smith. The court's own finding that Maranda's
day care program provided her with a meaningful experience, and
testimony from a psychologist indicated that Ms. Ireland had chosen well
for her daughter:
Assuming Miss Ireland returns to Ann Arbor in late August or
early September of this year and maintains the existing child
care or day care arrangements that she had in October of 1993,
those arrangements were organized very, very effectively, and I
would endorse them if she can duplicate them.
96
The sum total of the judge's findings regarding Grandma Smith as
a caretaker were: "[s]he appears to be in good health and is of an age
where she, in the court's opinion, could readily handle a small child."1
7
The findings regarding Ms. Ireland's choice of day care were that it
"apparently was appropriate and resulted in the child having a meaningful
experience."98 Even reading the court's two conclusions together in the
light most favorable to Smith, the findings are neutral as to the care
provided under either plan. And neutral evidence by its nature is not clear
and convincing evidence that Maranda's best interests support a change
in custody away from her lifetime home with her mother. The trial court
therefore must be reversed.
B. The Trial Court Improperly Found Ms. Ireland's
Educational Goals To Be A Reason To Take Maranda
From Her Mother's Custody.
1. The court below wrongly determined that Ms. Ire-
land's status as a student necessarily made her an
unsatisfactory custodian.
Again, there is no legal standard which justifies or any facts in the
record at all which support the court's finding that "[t]here is no way that
a single parent, attending an academic program at an institution as
prestigious as the University of Michigan, can do justice to their studies
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and the raising of an infant child. There are not that many hours in the
day."99 Jennifer Ireland is a young parent facing the challenge of caring
for her daughter while also pursuing her education full time. Many single
parents devote their energies to education, employment, or a combination
of the two. To say it is impossible to do both defies reality.
A sufficient factual basis would have been to demonstrate that every
single parent at the University of Michigan either flunked out of school
or was charged with child neglect. There was no such record evidence,
nor could there have been. What the trial court did was evaluate Ms.
Ireland's time outside the home differently than Smith's. This is clear legal
error and abuse of discretion. The Burchard concurrence clarified that
there was an abuse of discretion in the lower court's "assumption that
there is a negative relation between a woman's lack of wealth and her need
or desire to work and the quality of her parenting... ." That court
stated:
When it is no longer the norm for children to have a mother
at home all day, courts cannot indulge the notion that a
working parent is ipso facto a less satisfactory parent.... The
presumption is inappropriate because the relationship between
maternal employment and the "presumed facts" about the child's
best interests is not supported by reason or experience .... "
Here, Ms. Ireland is being penalized for choosing to place her child in
daycare while she pursues her academic goals. Smith was accorded a
presumption that he need not sacrifice his outside activities, whether work
or football, based on his gender and based on his ability to leave Maranda
with his mother while he is not at home. This double standard is contrary
to law. The Burchard case is again instructive:
The double standard appears again where, as here, the father is
permitted to rely on the care which someone else will give to
a child. It is not uncommon for courts to award custody to a
father when care will actually be provided by a relative, second
wife, or even a babysitter. (citation omitted) However, the
implicit assumption that such care is the equivalent of that
which a nonworking mother would provide "comes dangerously
99. Op, 8.
100. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 541, 724 P.2d at 493.
101. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 542-43, 724 P.2d at 493-94.
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close to implying that mothers are fungible-that one woman
will do just as well as another in rearing any particular chil-
dren."1
02
In essence, the lower court here is using the Child Custody Act as a
screen with which to hide "outmoded notions of a woman's role being
near hearth and home... ."103 Applying such a penalty to a working
student mother is reversible error.
2. The lower court misapplies "stability" to
mean only geographic stability.
The decision of the lower court imports an irrelevant consider-
ation-namely day care-into its consideration of factor (e). This alone
is error mandating reversal. But the court further erred by valuing
geographic over emotional stability and in finding that custody of
Maranda should go to Smith under that wrong interpretation. That error
is contrary to law and an abuse of discretion which this court must
reverse.
The question of stable place versus stability and constancy in
relationship has been considered by Michigan courts and always in favor
of affirming and supporting the relationship. In Baker, the Michigan
Supreme Court awarded custody to the mother who lived in Colorado,
rather than to the father who lived in Michigan with his parents, despite
the fact that the child was more at home geographically in Michigan.1
04
In DeGrow, this Court stated: "[t]he definition of a[n] [established]
custodial environment elaborated on in Baker, supra, emphasized the
continuity and strength of an established relationship between a custodi-
an and a child. The custodial environment is the family unit which
cannot be destroyed by a simple change in geographic location."'0 5
The court properly found that Maranda has an established custodial
environment with her mother, which necessarily means that the relation-
ship between Maranda and her mother is stable, regardless of where they
102. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 545-46, 724 E2d at 496 (citing N. Polikoff, WhyAre Mothers
Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REp. 235 (1982)).
103. Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 542, 729 P.2d at 493 (citing Gulyas v. Gulyas, 75 Mich.
App. 138, 254 N.W.2d 818 (1977) (Riley, J., dissenting)).
104. Baker, 411 Mich. at 573, 309 N.W.2d at 533.
105. DeGrow v. DeGrow, 112 Mich. App. 260, 266-67, 315 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1982).
See also Adams v. Adams, 100 Mich. App. 1, 298 N.W.2d 871 (1980); Hutchins v.
Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236, 269 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
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reside. No similar finding was made regarding Maranda's relationship
with her father: his award of custody by the trial court is based on
geography-on the predicate that he will reside with his parents and that
his mother will provide care for Maranda.
Applied correctly, factor (e) would have weighed in Ms. Ireland's
favor. Permanence as a family unit means more than just geography. It
means the desire and the intent to create a family which will endure
through material changes, through inconvenience, through relocation,
through financial hardship, and through lifetimes. It is more than clear
that Ms. Ireland had both the intent and the desire and that she took all
possible steps to ensure that the family of herself and Maranda would
endure through the many changes and challenges they faced. The trial
judge himself found "that the mother looks to the future to have this
relationship continued on a permanent basis.""0 6 Smith can claim no
such record. He has made no comparable effort to establish himself and
Maranda as a permanent family unit. For the first year of his daughter's
life, Smith did not see her at all. He started to see her when he started
dating Ms. Ireland. It was not until around Maranda's first birthday that
Smith saw his daughter for the first time and began to reconsider his
decision about adoption. Smith has never voluntarily provided material
or financial support for his daughter. In fact, Smith has repeatedly
petitioned the court to ensure that his court-ordered support be as low
as allowable by law. While the existence of a bank account, purportedly
for Maranda, is laudable, that money has not been used by Smith to
provide for his daughter or pay the arrearages on his court-ordered child
support or Maranda's medical bills. During the time Ms. Ireland was
caring for Maranda and establishing herself and her daughter as a family
unit, Smith was playing football and his many other sports. He has made
no effort, whether it be emotional, psychological, or financial, to estab-
lish himself and Maranda as a family unit.
The Child Custody Act recognizes that parent-child relationships,
not geographic locations, are critical to custody determinations. Under
the lower court's misguided analysis, any child whose parent is in the
military and subject to periodic moves would seem to be in an unstable
environment, no matter how loving, caring, concerned, and conscientious
her parent or parents. Any child who summers in one home and winters
in another with his parents would be deemed to be in an unstable
environment regardless of his relationship with his parents or his parents'
106. Op, 3.
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ability to care for him. And joint physical custody would never be an
option in any case, despite the Child Custody Act's provision for such
an arrangement.'07
For Maranda, "instability" would not come from being in a differ-
ent bedroom an hour's drive from where she was born: it would come
from being taken from her mother's custody. By valuing geography over
Maranda's key relationship with her mother, the court below acted
contrary to the law and facts and erred in its transfer of custody. That
decision must be reversed.
3. The trial court's view of "best interests"
evaluates only the short term.
The trial court's decision is contrary to law, because it looks only to
the next one or two years and not to the long-term best interests of
Maranda. In order to change custody, there must be more than a
marginal improvement in the child's life.' The trial court looked only
at the time between now and when Maranda starts school, at which time
she will not be spending the majority of her day in the home. Instead,
she will be "supervised a great part of the time by strangers" such as
kindergarten and other grade school teachers. If the trial court's decision
were actually the law, school itself would be seen as undesirable for
children.
Had the trial court looked at Maranda's long-term interests, it
would had to have determined on the record that Ms. Ireland provides
the best opportunity for a better life. The record shows that Smith lives
with his parents, has a part-time job doing yard work, takes a few classes
at a community college with no real goal in mind, and has no plans to
change his life for the indefinite future. Ms. Ireland, on the other hand,
excelled in school, earned scholarships to one of the top universities in
the nation, has created her own home and life with Maranda in Ann
Arbor while working toward her degree, and has plans for an advanced
degree in business or law. Ms. Ireland is working to create the roots for
a successful life for herself and her daughter. As Maranda watches her
mother study and work hard on a daily basis while she grows up,
Maranda will learn by example and will have a firmer foundation on
107. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.26a (West 1993).
108. Harper v. Harper, 199 Mich. App. 409, 411-12, 502 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
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which to make a success of her own life. By ignoring the long-term
benefits for Maranda of being with her mother, the trial court commit-
ted reversible error.
III. A TRIAL COURT CANNOT DISMISS FACTOR (K) (DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE) AS "SUPERnUOUS."
The trial court committed clear legal error by failing to correctly
apply MCL 722.23(k) regarding domestic violence. The trial judge
stated: "[t]he issue of domestic violence is not pertinent here. The parties
in their youthful way apparently crashed and mauled one another. It is
all superfluous and can have no bearing on the issue of custody." 09
Under the statute, the judge does not have the discretion to treat the
violence as not pertinent to Maranda's best interests. It is reversible error
for the court to have ignored factor (k).
A. Domestic Violence Is A Mandatory Factor.
Before the Child CustodyAct (MCL 722.23) was amended in 1993,
judges were allowed, but not required, to consider domestic violence when
evaluating the best interests of a child. In recognition of the tremendous
toll domestic violence wreaks upon children, the Michigan Legislature
amended MCL 722.23 to require consideration of "domestic violence,
regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by
the child." The amendment "explicitly require[d] a judge deciding on
custody of a child to consider and evaluate the existence of any domestic
violence in the home of the prospective custodial parent."10 In other
words, the amendment made consideration of domestic violence non-
discretionary.
There have not yet been any appellate opinions in Michigan
reviewing factor (k). Illinois has had a similar factor in its custody statute
for nearly ten years: a court must consider "physical violence or threat of
physical violence by the child's potential custodian, whether directed
against the child or ... another person.""' In fact, the presence of
domestic violence can be the decisive factor in the court's determination."
2
109. Op, 10.
110. House Legislative Analysis Section, First Analysis, House Bill 4064, at 1 (1993).
111. ILL ANN. Srxr. Ch. 750, para. 602(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
112. See Wiley v Wiley, 199 111. App. 3d 169, 176, 556 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1990).
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Illinois, like Michigan, recognizes that a battering parent hurts children
even when the children have not yet been directly physically battered. A
court "need not wait until [the child] herself becomes the victim of
physical abuse nor wait until the repeated beatings of her mother cause
so much emotional damage that [the child] is permanently affected."113
Michigan case law must confirm the legislative mandate and refuse to
allow trial courts to disregard domestic violence as a best interests
consideration.
B. Domestic Violence Includes Emotional As Well
As Physical Abuse, And Both Hurt Children.
Smith and his parents perpetrated domestic violence against Ms.
Ireland. Domestic violence or battering is characterized by an entire
pattern of controlling behaviors punctuated by outbursts of physical
violence."' Though the criminal law often focuses only on the outbursts
of physical violence,115 social scientists and intervention agencies are clear
that controlling behaviors, such as verbal abuse, refusal of financial
support, and control over a victim's daily life and routine are an integral
part of a batterer's assaultive pattern. Therefore, a criminal conviction for
a single assault does not necessarily determine the existence or effect of
domestic violence. Victims of domestic violence suffer harm from the
batterer's harassment and control measures as well as physical and
emotional harm from the outbursts of physical violence. Children of
batterers are also harmed physically, emotionally, and psychologically by
the batterer's use of a cycle of power, control, and abuse. The American
Bar Association (RABA") recognizes that children suffer harm from a
batterer's controlling behaviors. Specifically, the ABA recommends:
[w]here there is proof of abuse, batterers should be presumed
by law to be unfit custodians for their children. There are three
characteristics of such unfit custodians. First, the abuser has
ignored the child's interests by harming the child's other parent.
Second, the pattern of control and domination common to
113. In reA.D.R., 186 Il. App. 3d 386, 393-94, 542 N.E.2d 487, 492 (1989).
114. See Luw L TIFFr, BxrIsuNiG OF WOMEN: THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION AND THE
CASE FOR PREVENTION 18 (1993).
115. Michigan law recognizes that a batterer's terrorism and assaultive behavior may take
non-physical forms. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAws AN. § 750.411h-.411i (West Supp.
1995) (anti-stalking law).
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abusers often continues after the physical separation of the
abuser and victim. Third, abusers are highly likely to use
children in their care, or attempt to gain custody of their
children, as a means of controlling their former spouse or
partner.
1 6
The evidence presented at trial supports the finding that Smith and his
parents engaged in a pattern of domestic violence which was harmful to
Ms. Ireland and Maranda.
This Court cannot lightly ignore that Maranda is at a significant risk
of suffering physical abuse perpetrated by her father. In 1985, one study
found that sixty-three percent of abusive partners battered their children
as well.117 Another study shows that fifty percent of batterers use violence
more severe than pushing, grabbing, spanking, slapping, or throwing their
children more than twice ayear as opposed to seven percent of nonviolent
husbands."' The Michigan Legislature was expressly concerned with the
fact that "various studies have estimated the percentage of wife beaters
who also abuse children in the home to be from 45 to 70 percent. In
contrast, only about 20 percent of batterers are violent to individuals
outside the home, and may appear quite respectable to the casual judicial
observer.""
9
Even if Smith does not assault Maranda directly, it is extremely likely
that she will watch him batter another partner besides her mother. The
likelihood that a batterer will perpetrate violence in a new relationship
ranges anywhere from fifty-seven to eighty-six percent. 20 A child who
witnesses abusive behavior will learn that violence, stalking, intimidation,
and control are an appropriate mode of interaction with loved ones. The
result is that "[w]hen toddlers witness violence, it interferes with their
ability to develop autonomy, and they begin to develop shame and doubt
their own abilities to do things. Regressive behavior and somatic com-
plaints are common during this time." 121 When a preschooler is exposed
116. HowARD DAVIDSON, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 13 (1994).
117. Jean Giles-Sims, A Longitudinal Study of Battered Children of Battered Wives 34 J.
APPUED Fm. & CHILD STUD. 205-10 (1985).
118. Murry A. Straus, Ordinary Volence, ChildAbuse, and Wife-Beating, in THE DARK SIDE
OF FAMIUmS, (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983).
119. House Legislative Analysis Section, supra note 110, at 1.
120. Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families Experiencing Woman Abuse,
39 SocrLk WORK 51, 53 (1994).
121. Martha Wingerd Bristor, Growing Up Amidst Violence: The Impact on Children, MICH.
FAm. L.J., Aug. 1994, at 44.
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to domestic violence, she may become afraid and be unwilling to explore
new opportunities."' She may also attempt to "stop the fight by diverting
[her] parents' attention to other matters, perhaps even directing the anger
toward [herself]."' 3 At school age, the child experiencing her father's
violence toward her mother will have declining school performance,
present a flat affect, and manifest feelings of inferiority. 4
In addition, Maranda's relationship with her mother will suffer if she
is placed in the custody of her mother's assailant. Abusers often try to
control ex-partners through the manipulation of the parties' children.
125
Indeed, bringing a custody action itself is a means of perpetuating that
control. An abuser may try to control a partner by having the children
act as "spies," 126 which is one of the reasons that the American Bar
Association has recommended that there be a presumption against custody
with batterers.
127
The trial judge committed clear legal error when he labeled the
evidence of violence "superfluous," and "not pertinent." Trial judges do
not have that discretion.
Despite his statement that domestic violence was "not pertinent,"
the trial judge did find that "the parties in their youthful way apparently
crashed and mauled each other." This characterization by the judge that
the parties were somehow being like playful puppies is a finding against
the great weight of the evidence as well as a view of the evidence that is
not plausible. 12 This court must look at the evidence which was before
the trial court when it evaluated factor (k). A proper application of factor
(k) will lead this court to conclude that MCL 722.23 weighs in Ms.
Ireland's favor. The record shows clear evidence of a pattern of assaults,
stalking, harassment, and controlling behavior perpetrated against Ms.
Ireland by Smith and his agents, and that Smith and his parents expressed
no remorse nor intent to stop those behaviors. If the trial court's custody
decision is enforced, factor (k) will be a nullity and Maranda's custodial
environment will be pervaded by battering behavior which will pose a
threat to her physical, psychological, and emotional well-being. The lower
court must be reversed.
122. Bristor, supra note 121, at 44.
123. Bristor, supra note 121, at 44.
124. Bristor, supra note 121, at 44.
125. Saunders, supra note 120, at 53.
126. Saunders, supra note 120, at 53.
127. See DAvIDSON, supra note 116.
128. Fletcher, 200 Mich. App. at 512, 504 N.W.2d at 687.
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C. Smith's Tactics Are Typical Of Batterers' Methods Of
Power And Control Over An Intimate Partner.
In late 1992 and early 1993, Smith assaulted Ms. Ireland twice
within a week, both times in response to a disagreement over visitation.
12 9
Smith admitted that on December 24, 1992, he assaulted Ms. Ireland and
"grabbed her by her arms." Ms. Ireland then tried to free herself from him
by biting him on the wrist.13 Twenty-month old Maranda saw her father
assault her mother."' Ms. Ireland reported this assault to the police.
132
Ms. Ireland testified that just a week later, on January 1, 1993, Smith
came to her friend's home and "pushed me up against the wall and pulled
me back down the stairs; tried to grab me [sic] arm and hands."'33 Smith's
own testimony revealed his threatening behavior toward Ms. Ireland.
Smith testified that he went to Ms. Ireland's home and was told that she
was gone.' 3' He then tracked her down at her friend's home. While
Smith's father waited in the driveway, Smith entered the home. 35 Smith
testified that, "Jenny was gone. Obviously she knew what was going on
and felt that she was in trouble. Jennifer ran into the basement and tried
to lock herself into a bathroom." 136 Smith himself told the court that he
knew that Ms. Ireland was afraid of him.
After she fled to the basement, Smith testified that he followed her,
pushed open the bathroom door, and accused her of not giving him
visitation. Smith said that when Ms. Ireland tried to escape, he "did stand
in her way so she couldn't run again." 37 In her continued attempts to
escape, Ms. Ireland pushed Smith to the stairwell, and Smith admitted
that "I did push her back from me." He then claimed that Ms. Ireland
started up the stairs and fell down while he was behind her.
38
This is not a question of "he said, she said." Both versions show
Smith's assaultive and threatening behavior toward Ms. Ireland. Ms.
129. T IliA, 218, 222-225. Both assaults were promptly reported to the appropriate police
agencies, weeks before any action regarding Maranda was filed in Circuit Court.
130. T liA, 219.
131. T liA, 219.
132. T I, 86.
133. T I, 86.
134. T liA, 221-222.
135. T II, 30; liA, 222.
136. T liA, 223.
137. T IliA, 223.
138. T liA, 223-224.
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Ireland testified that Smith pulled her down the stairs. Under Smith's
version of the assault, Ms. Ireland fell down the stairs in her frantic
attempt to escape from Smith after he had purposely trapped her in a
basement bathroom.
Smith's violence was emotional as well as physical: he testified that
he made a surreptitious tape recording of this event so that "Jennifer...
couldn't twist anything around, I would have something backing me
up."139 His failure to produce this tape at trial or to any police investigator
suggests that in fact the tape recording would have verified his assaultive
and threatening behavior toward Ms. Ireland on January 1, 1993.140 Even
more importantly, this secretive tape recording of his encounter with his
child's mother (before any litigation had been instituted by either party)
is yet another example of Smith's attempts to harass and control his
former partner.
Although the trial judge implied that the assaults were mutual, the
evidence shows that Smith assaulted and terrorized Ms. Ireland. The
testimony demonstrates a concrete pattern of controlling and abusive
behavior by Smith when he does not get what he wants from Ms. Ireland.
The trial court disregarded and diminished the testimony about the
assaults apparently because of an erroneous and unsubstantiated myth that
women make false charges of violence in order to win custody cases. Ms.
Ireland reported Smith's assaults in a timely fashion to the local police
agencies before she brought the complaint for child support, which Smith
countered with a custody motion. Ms. Ireland's realization that discussions
with Smith were likely to end in assaults caused her to turn to the court
system for assistance and intervention.
The trial court also failed to recognize that Smith's physical out-
bursts are only a portion of the violence which he perpetrated and
continues to perpetrate against Ms. Ireland and to which he subjects
Maranda. Social workers with Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in
Duluth, Minnesota have identified typical behaviors exhibited by
batterers in order to exert power and control over their current or former
139. T IliA, 225.
140. This Court is entitled to draw a negative inference against Smith for his failure to
produce the tape recording. See Fontana v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 199, 270
N.W. 266 (1936); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Schneider, 181 Mich. 538, 148 N.W. 173
(1914).
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partners.14' The characteristics described in the Duluth Project's "Power




Smith and his parents consistently stalked Ms. Ireland and her
family and evidenced no remorse nor recognition that their behavior was
threatening as well as illegal. Charles Smith, Appellee's father, testified
specifically:
Q.: Do you ever drive by Jennifer's house?
A: Every night.
Q And what time?
A: Usually after work.
Q: What time would that be?
A: Somewhere between 11:00 and midnight.
1 43
On cross-examination, the witness explained his daily drive-bys:
Q Today you testified that you drive by the house every
single day?
A: Every single day I work.
Q: Why?
A: Just more or less to find out who was going over
there; what was going on. 1
4
Q. You know if Jennifer goes to church?
A: Since we started the trial, yes.
Q How do you know that?
A: Because I have been sitting around the church for a
couple years...
COURT: Is that your Parish, Mr. Smith?
141. Tft, supra, note 114, at 18-20.
142. Reprinted in TIFFr, supra note 114, at 20.
143. T III, 302.
144. T III, 330.
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A: No, it is not.
COURT: You went over just to check up on them; is that
the idea?
A: Yes. More or less, yes, your honor.
145
Grandpa Smith also admitted following Ms. Ireland's mother. 116 Later,
Deborah Smith acknowledged her own stalking:
My husband drives by Jenny's at night on the way from work
and if I'm asleep he will leave me a note or wake me and let
me know Matt is there. It's like 12:00, 12:30 at night, and I
am an early riser so sometimes 6:15 and 7:30 1 would drive by
to see if the car is still there.
147
She testified that she drove past Ms. Ireland's workplace repeatedly.
148
One morning, Smith and his mother eyed the Ireland home, called the
Ireland residence from a phone booth, returned to the home, and laid
in wait for Ms. Ireland to come out of her house.4 9 Grandma Smith
admitted that she was aware that this stalking behavior was upsetting to
Ms. Ireland when she testified, "she wants to stop me from doing it
because she doesn't want us to know what's going on." 5' Through these
statements, Smith and his parents blatantly admitted that they intended
to keep track of Ms. Ireland's every move on a daily basis. Two separate
stalking complaints were filed against all three of the Smiths during the
course of the trial, but they refused to curtail their behavior or to
recognize that it was controlling and assaultive.
151
In addition to following her and monitoring her home, Smith and
his mother tape recorded conversations with Ms. Ireland and her mother
without their knowledge. Smith testified that he recorded Ms. Ireland on
January 1, 1993, while he attacked her.152 Deborah Smith testified that
she surreptitiously tape recorded Ms. Ireland's mother on November 14,
1993.15 Smith and his mother are open and notorious about their
145. T III, 304.
146. T liA, 307-308.
147. T liA, 146.
148. T liA, 157.
149. T liA, 157.
150. T IIlA, 138.
151. T II, 301; liA, 4.
152. T liA, 225.
153. T liA, 162.
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stalking behavior and their attempts to monitor and control Ms. Ireland.
It was impermissible error for the trial judge to dismiss this evidence in
his evaluation of the Smith's proposed custodial environment.
2. "Using Children."
Smith called Protective Services twice to accuse Ms. Ireland of abuse
or neglect. 54 The agency took no action because they believed Smith was
only inventing accusations for the custody case.155 The trial judge
acknowledged that the evidence of child abuse was not credible.' 56
Unfortunately, the trial court failed to recognize that Smith's accusations
were a battering tactic used to threaten and control Ms. Ireland, which
must be evaluated under MCL 722.23(k).1
57
3. "Using Economic Abuse."
Batterers commonly withhold support in order to impoverish and
punish their former partners. Smith claims that he was putting money
in a bank account for Maranda. 5' However, he made no support
payments until the court required him to do so, by which time Maranda
was nearly two years old. Smith's use of this battering tactic shows he is
unable to put his daughter's welfare ahead of his need to control his
former partner.
4. "Using Emotional Abuse."
When a battered woman seeks counseling, this often is presented as
evidence of emotional instability and parental unfitness. Through these
accusations a batterer intends to dissuade his victim from seeking help
so he can continue to control her. At trial, Smith's counsel attacked Ms.
154. T liA, 187.
155. T IIIB, 31.
156. T IIIB, 30.
157. Another example illustrates Smith's use of this tactic: rather than cooperate with his
former partner about their daughter's needs, Smith concentrated his efforts on
attempting to manipulate and control Ms. Ireland. Mrs. Smith testified that Smith
would often draw barely perceptible lines on Maranda's medicine bottles to monitor
whether Ms. Ireland was giving the minor child medicine. T IIIA, 134. In other
words, Smith was more concerned with "trapping" Ms. Ireland and collecting
"evidence" against her than with ensuring proper medical treatment for his daughter.
158. T IIIA, 204-205.
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Ireland for seeing a psychiatrist and then implicitly suggested that Ms.
Ireland was taking Prozac. 15 In essence, Smith would have the trial court
believe that a teenage mother who is battered by her former partner
should be punished for seeking help.
At the same time, Smith is more interested in how he thinks things
will look in court than he is with the effect that the transfer would have
on Maranda. His refusal of transition counseling shows control of Ms.
Ireland rather than concern for Maranda. 60 For Smith, controlling his
ex-partner has and will always take priority over his daughter's financial,
physical, and emotional needs.
5. "Minimizing, Denying, Blaming."
Consistent with typical battering behavior, Smith blames Ms.
Ireland for his violence. Smith claimed that he grabbed Ms. Ireland by
the arms because she wanted him to leave.16' He refused to leave her
home when asked to do so. He explained that refusal by saying that he
wanted her to face her problems.162 As to the assault on January 1, 1993,
he testified that he "had" to physically block Ms. Ireland's escape from
the bathroom to force her to listen to his accusations. 16 3 He also claimed
that it was Ms. Ireland's own fault that she fell down the stairs; in
reality, even if Smith did not drag her down the stairs, she fell in her
frantic attempt to escape him.'
Another battering behavior especially relevant to the present case is
that a batterer will "raise the attributes of power through ... withdraw-
ing, through withholding emotional support or himself."' 65 This perfectly
describes Smith's method of punishing Maranda. Smith testified that he
disciplines Maranda by telling her "Daddy doesn't like that."'66 Addition-
ally, Mrs. Smith testified that "when she does something wrong all he
has to do is say, 'Maranda, Daddy is not happy with what you did' and
that just breaks her heart. She doesn't want that to happen. Usually,
159. T I, 27.
160. T V, 15-17.
161. T IIIA, 218.
162. T IIIA, 218. Apparently, he at least acknowledges that he is her problem.
163. T IIIA, 223.
164. T IIIA, 223-224.
165. TPFr, supra note 114, at 35.
166. T IIIA, 237.
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that's all it takes." 167 Smith explained his controlling behavior by saying
"it seems to be real effective because she always wants me to be happy.
That's the big thing for her for me to be happy and to-it's a big thing
for me." 161 Smith's tactics illustrate the value he places on teaching
Maranda how to be a victim. As an adult, Ms. Ireland had the ability to
understand this manipulation; Maranda does not. Maranda is learning
that her only job is to keep her father happy. He responded to Ms.
Ireland's insubordination (valuing other people, such as her own mother,
more than him) 69 with violence and efforts (such as stalking) to main-
tain control. If Smith is ever responsible for Maranda all day every day,
rather than a few hours at a time during visitation at his parents' home,
he is likely to become frustrated if Maranda doesn't succeed in keeping
him happy. When he became frustrated with Ms. Ireland, he responded
with violence; it is likely that he will respond to Maranda with violence
as well.
Through his own direct actions, his parents' actions, and his misuse
of the court system, Smith has assaulted, intimidated, stalked, threatened,
and harassed Ms. Ireland. Ms. Ireland has attempted to protect herself
and her daughter by avoiding contact with Smith, filing police reports,
and using the courts instead of risking assaultive negotiations. These
actions have limited the success and number of Smith's direct physical
assaults, yet he is no less of a batterer, because "[b]attering is the pattern
of intimidation, coercion, terrorism or violence, the sum of all past acts
of violence and the promises of fiture violence that achieves enhanced
power and control for the [batterer] over [the] partner."1 ° His violent
and controlling behavior, as well as his refusal to address his battering,
fits squarely within the dangers contemplated by factor (k) of the best
interests test. That factor should weigh in favor of Ms. Ireland and
prevent any finding of clear and convincing evidence that Maranda could
ever be placed safely in her father's physical custody.
If physical custody of Maranda were to be given to Smith, Maranda
would be raised by a batterer. She would likely suffer physical and
emotional abuse at the hands of her father, 171 she would observe her
father's abuse of subsequent partners, and her relationship with her
167. T IIIA, 119.
168. T IIIA, 237.
169. T IIIA, 214.
170. TFFr, supra note 114, at 19.
171. His methods of discipline demonstrate that he in fact already has emotionally abused
Maranda.
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mother would be poisoned by stalking and suspicion. These are the
reasons the Michigan Legislature mandated that trial judges consider
domestic violence; these are the reasons that Appellant must not be
awarded custody. The error of the lower court requires reversal.
IV. THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO EFFECTiVELY
AWARD CUSTODY TO NON-PARTIES.
The trial judge's decision is a defacto award of custody to Smith's
parents. Rather than decide which parent will have physical custody of
Maranda, the trial court decided that neither parent met his ideal of a
custodian for Maranda, so he looked outside the law and found his ideal
in Grandma Smith. 172 The trial judge's de facto award of custody to
Smith's mother is a palpable abuse of discretion, clear legal error, against
the great weight of the evidence, and mandates reversal.
A. Smith's Parents Are Not Parties, And Cannot Be
Awarded Custody.
Under well settled Michigan law, Defendant's parents have no
standing to either sue for custody of Maranda or intervene in this case.
The Michigan Supreme Court has prohibited original third party
complaints for custody in a Circuit Court.'73 By elevating Smith's
parents to the status of de facto parties, and then essentially granting
them custody of Maranda, the trial judge allowed third parties with no
rights in the case to interfere with Ms. Ireland's and Maranda's rights to
the natural parent-child relationship.17 That elevation of Smith's parents
is reversible error.
B. The Trial Court Evaluated Smith's Parents As Custo-
dians, Rather Than Smith.
The trial court clearly anticipates the paternal grandparents as the
primary caregivers of Maranda if Smith has custody. "The paternal
172. T IIIB, 610.
173. In re Clausen, 442 Mich. 648, 682, 502 N.W.2d 649, 663-64 (1993); Bowie v.
Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992); Ruppel v. Lesner, 421 Mich. 559,
364 N.W.2d 665 (1984) ("It is not enough that a person assert to be a 'contestant'
or 'claim' a right to custody with respect to a child.... The Court of Appeals has
correctly read our decision in Bowie as requiring the existence of some substantive
right to custody.").
174. Clausen, 442 Mich. at 686-87, 502 N.W.2d at 665-66.
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grandparents have made a very adequate and suitable place for the
grandchild." 175 "[Smith's] parents would welcome the minor child to
their home."' 76 There is no discussion as to what Smith alone has done
or has not done, or what he is capable of doing, to support or care for
Maranda. The trial judge treats Smith's parents as parties and thus
avoids a discussion of what each actual party has or has not provided.
This substitution of Smith's parents for the real party, Steven Smith,
allows the trial judge to bypass consideration of Smith's nonsupport of
his child, which is clear legal error and an abuse of discretion mandat-
ing reversal.
The court's opinion leaves no doubt that the court decided to
change custody on the grandparents' willingness and ability to financial-
ly support Maranda. On cross-examination, Ms. Ireland was asked:
Q: If the Court were to award custody of Maranda to
Steven, he is living with his parents, would you say
that his parents would be able to provide, with him,
good home and health care for Maranda?
A: His parents might be able to support Maranda and
provide for Maranda because Steven can't provide
what they can provide for her .... 17
Smith's mother testified about her and her husband's financial support
of Maranda:
Q: Have you and your husband ever paid any expenses
or bills for Maranda?
A: Yes. [...]
Q What kind of things did you buy?
A: Everything that a child needs. We bought a
highchair, we bought a couple of car seats, we





177. T I, 144-145 (emphasis added).
178. T IIIA, 104-105.
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Craig Smith [Grandpa Smith] was questioned along similar lines.
179
Defendant's Exhibit D is a collection of receipts purportedly totalling
$5,743.79 for items Smith's parents bought for Maranda between April
of 1992 and May of 1994.180
The grandparents' willingness and ability to provide financial
support for Maranda is irrelevant in this custody action.' The proper
legal question is not whether a housewife who is not employed outside
the home is the ideal custodian for Maranda; the question is whether
Smith has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the
custodial environment should be changed. He has not. Though the
testimony may well show that the grandparents are willing to take care
of Maranda,8 2 the family unit to be evaluated under factor (e) is not
Maranda and her grandparents, but rather Maranda and her father. By
substituting Smith's parents into the equation, the trial court commit-
ted reversible error.
The trial judge did not consider Smith's "capacity and disposition"
to provide support for his daughter. The trial judge states that "this suit
was filed in order to force the defendant into making some form of
monetary payment to assist the raising of the child."" 3 The judge
presumed Smith's inability to meet his financial responsibilities and
ignored the fact that Smith has an obligation to provide support for his
child and has made litde or no effort to meet his obligation. Smith
testified he has a job, and a bank account, purportedly for Maranda"'
Smith has never voluntarily contributed to his daughter's support and,
according to the Friend of the Court records, owes child support and
medical expense arrearages for Maranda. The trial judge merely substituted
Smith's parents for Smith. Had the trial judge considered the proper
evidence, he would have kept Maranda in her mother's home.
Given the clarity of Michigan law regarding third-party custody, the
trial judge's insertion of Smith's parents into the best interests evaluation
179. T III, 316-317.
180. T IIIA, 110-112.
181. Additionally, their voluntary financial support of their granddaughter is not depen-
dent upon Smith having physical or legal custody, as the court seemed to think.
They could help support Maranda no matter who is the custodian; they have
chosen not to provide direct support to Maranda while she is in her mother's
custody.
182. T II, 311-312; T IIIA, 125-126, 128; T IIIB, 24.
183. Op, 5 (emphasis added).
184. T IIIA 189-192, 204-207; Exhibit I. Smith and his parents are all named on the bank
account.
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and his defacto award of custody to Smith's parents was a clear legal error
and an abuse of discretion. The trial court must be reversed.
V. THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION WAS INFECTED WITH AN IM-
PERMISSIBLE BIAS AGAINST WORKING MOTHERS AND IN FAVOR
OF "TRADITIONAL ' TWO-PARENT FAMILIES.
By its nature, a custody case is about which single parent is the better
custodian for a minor child. The traditional, mom-and-dad, two parent
family is not part of the custody dispute equation. The expectation that
it should be part of a custody case, and the assumption that it is always
necessarily the better alternative, hurts single mothers who cannot meet
that ideal of a traditional, full-time, stay at home, non-working mother.
In this case, the trial judge did not make his custody determination
on the basis of the parties before him. The trial judge based his deter-
mination on what he thought the "ideal" family should look like. In his
application of the guidelines, the trial judge was not guided by factors
(a)-(k), he was guided by his preference for the traditional two-parent
family. Because Smith's parents looked most like the "ideal" family, he
awarded custody to them. In the first paragraph of his opinion the trial
judge describes Ms. Ireland as "an unmarried person."" 5 Nowhere does
the trial judge apply similar language to Smith. While discussing Ms.
Ireland's future care arrangements for Maranda, the trial judge states:
"[t]he mother's program would require that the child be in day care....
It would be the mother's intention to continue this on until such time
as she either graduates, as previously stated, or her marital circumstances
change."'86 The trial judge is nowhere as preoccupied with Smith's marital
status. Ms. Ireland's family is denigrated in comparison to the nuclear
family preference. As the trial judge describes Ms. Ireland's family, "the
plaintiff, her mother and sister, have constituted a support group for the
child." They are not even accorded the status of family.18 7 There is a
double standard applied, to Ms. Ireland's detriment. Ms. Ireland is judged
by a standard of single parenthood wherein single parents are presumed
to be bad. It is clear from the court's decision that the operative presump-
tion applied to single parents, especially those attending a university, is
that they are neglectful-neglect which can only be offset by the presence
185. Op, 1.
186. Op, 7 (emphasis added).
187. Op, 2.
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of the second parent. Whether based on a bias against day care, teenage
mothers who work hard to attend college and better their lives and the
lives of their child, or an outmoded view of what a mother should do and
be, the trial court's decision is in error and must be reversed.
The trial judge's narrow definition of family is also infected by
impermissible gender bias. In 1989, the Michigan Supreme Court Task
Force on Gender Issues in the Courts issued its final report. The Report
identified five "stereotypes that influence some judges and disadvantage
mothers." Four of those five stereotypes are evident in the lower court's
opinion:
a. Fathers who exhibit any interest in parenting should be
granted custody despite years of primary caretaking by
mothers.
b. Women who place great emphasis on careers.., are some-
times considered less fit to be awarded custody than men
who place a similar emphasis on their careers.
c. Women's... social relationships are sometimes judged by
a stricter standard than are men's.
d. When judges look to financial status or the presence of a
stay-home mother as a factor in deciding custody, the
lower post-divorce economic status of women-caused in
part by inequitable maintenance, property and child sup-
port awards-disadvantages the mother seeking custody."'
The Task Force recommended that "[e]ducational programs for judges
should emphasize that the 'best interest' of the child should specifically
relate to the individual parenting ability of each party and not the societal
role placed upon their gender."8 9 The gender bias in the trial court's
decision is palpable and consistent with pervasive stereotypes which have
been found to be used in custody cases to disadvantage mothers. A
decision infected with bias is necessarily not based on the law or the facts
in the record, making reversal the only remedy.
188. MICH. SUP. CT., FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON
GENDER ISSUES rN Tm CouRTs 69 (1989).
189. MicH. Sup. CT., supra note 69, at 72.
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Nowhere in his opinion does the trial judge apply a negative standard
of single parenthood to Smith. Smith's marital status was not important
to the trial judge. The lower court applied a different standard to Jennifer
Ireland than to Steven Smith when determining the threshold of what
constitutes good or acceptable parenting. As a result of this bias, mothers
are held to a higher standard than fathers in judgments about parenting
skills.
The court's analysis of the evidence makes this different standard
clear. Ms. Ireland is "relegat[ing] maternal obligations" when she relies
on the support and guidance of her own mother in caring for her
daughter;' 90 Smith is providing an appropriate custodial home, in which
the devoted attentions of his mother are instrumental in providing care
for Maranda.' 9' Ms. Ireland is characterized as "continuing on in a vein
that was really inconsistent with being the mother of a new born child;"
the father's similar actions are referred to only as "basically doing the same
thing," or continuing on with his activities and making progress toward
his graduation from high school.' 92 While Ms. Ireland's time away from
Maranda is referred to as forcing her child to "be in essence raised and
supervised a great part of the time by strangers," 193 Smith's time away
from Maranda is allowing his mother to "devote her entire time to raising
the child."' 94 The court went so far as to characterize the evidence as
"establishing the fact that plaintiff was sexually indiscriminate as a young
girl." As to Smith, he "wasn't much better." 195 Again and again, Ms.
Ireland is criticized in specific, degrading language, and Smith gets by with
generalities, an excusing tone, and always (unwarranted) favorable
comparisons with Ms. Ireland.
The best interests standard is meant to be a flexible, breathing tool
for making decisions in an area always fraught with uncertainty. The
Child Custody Act dictates that decisions which determine custody must
be made with reference to one paramount concern: the best interests of
the child. Decisions infected by gender bias are contrary to the best
interests of a child. 96 The enumerated factors are meant to counteract







196. MIcH. Sup. CT., supra note 188, at 62.
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personal area of law. As a policy matter, Michigan law reinforces the
notion that parents must be free to raise their children as they choose,
within reasonable limits. Courts must affirm the parents' choices, so long
as the care their children receive meets a minimum threshold of accept-
ability.
Yet what the trial court ignored is that the family of Maranda and
her mother is in the most desirable ways exactly like the traditional family.
To Maranda, family has always been her mother. Other than the first
three weeks of life, she has always lived with her mother. She has always
been primarily cared for by her mother. Her extended family, including
maternal grandmother and aunt, are an important part of her life. With
her mother, she has love and security. She has stability in that relation-
ship. She is happy and thriving. As described by more than one witness,
and noted by the trial court, Maranda and her mother are a team: "the
mother and the child are united and.., the mother looks to the future
to have this relationship continued on a permanent basis." 197 What the
court failed to note, though, is that Maranda also looks to the future to
have her family continue as it has: living with her mother, even though
she may not be sleeping in the same bedroom every night between now
and her eighteenth birthday. Where Maranda loves is home, and that
means her mother.
CONCLUSION
There was no clear and convincing evidence presented justifying a
change of custody. The trial court's decision must be reversed outright,
and custody of Maranda must remain with her mother.
POSTSCRIPT
On December 27, 1994, after the briefs were filed in this case, the
Michigan Supreme Court decided the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 9 ' which
altered the standard of review in custody cases. Under Fletcher, the
reviewing court is required to remand a case where factual or dispositional
error is found.199
197. Op, 3.
198. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994).
199. Fletcher, 447 Mich. at 889, 526 N.W.2d at 897.
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In March 1995, the Court of Appeals granted Jennifer Ireland's
application for leave to appeal on the issue of whether Judge Cashen
should be disqualified because of bias or the appearance of bias. Ms.
Ireland's request for disqualification was based in part on Judge Cashen's
statements to the media which were critical of Ms. Ireland's abilities as
a parent, and contrary to his judicial findings.
On November 7, 1995, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
it was clear legal error for the trial court to consider the use of day care
as relevant to the Child Custody Act factor which is directed to the
permanence of the existing custodial home,200 and that there was no
factual basis for the trial court's finding that a single parent could not be
a student and a parent at the same time.2" 1 The Court of Appeals found
an established custodial environment with Ms. Ireland, °2 and found the
parties equal on eleven of the twelve child custody factors.2 3 The Court
remanded the case, as it was required to do so under the newly-decided
ruling in Fletcher, and ordered that a new judge hear the remand, finding
that the trial judge at least appeared to be biased because of his derogatory
statements to the media about Jennifer Ireland. °4
In late November 1995, Steve Smith filed an application for leave
to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
On May 21, 1996, the Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, modified the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. Ireland
v. Smith, 1996 WL 267743 (Mich. 1996). The supreme court clarified
the court of appeals' directions on remand, and ordered that the remand
could consider evidence since June 1994 on all factors in evaluating the
best interests of Maranda. Ireland, 1996 WL 267743 at *5. The court
remarked on the fact that 61 amici filed in support of Ms. Ireland and
stated that "placement of a child in a good day-care setting can have many
benefits and is in no sense a sign of parental neglect." Ireland, 1996 WL
267743 at *5.
The court also concluded that "[i]n light of all the circumstances,
this case should go forward with the judge to whom it has now been
200. Ireland v. Smith, 214 Mich. App. 235, 246, 542 N.W.2d 344, 349-50 (1995).
201. Ireland, 214 Mich. App. at 245-46, 542 N.W.2d at 349.
202. Ireland, 214 Mich. App. at 249, 542 N.W.2d at 348.
203. Ireland, 214 Mich. App. at 249, 542 N.W.2d at 351.
204. Ireland, 214 Mich. App. at 250-51, 542 N.W.2d at 351-52.
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assigned" although the court "located in this record no basis for the
disqualification of the first judge." Ireland, 1996 WL 267743 at *5.
The remand hearings were scheduled for July, 1996. Given the re-
viewing courts' opinions, there is no risk that Ms. Ireland's choice to place
Maranda in day-care will be held against her. Maranda was scheduled to
start kindergarten in September, 1996 in Ann Arbor, Michigan. t
